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If we want to explain cognitive processes with means of connectionist networks, 
these networks have to correspond with cognitive systems and their underlying 
biological mechanisms in different respects.  
The question of biological and cognitive plausibility of connectionist models 
arises from two different aspects – first, from the aspect of biology – on one 
hand, one has to have a fair understanding of biological mechanisms and cog-
nitive mechanisms in order to represent them in a model, and on the other hand 
there is the aspect of modeling – one has to know how to construct a model to 
represent precisely what we are aiming at. Computer power and modeling 
techniques have improved dramatically in recent 20 years, so the plausibility 
problem is being addressed in more adequate ways as well. Connectionist mod-
els are often used for representing different aspects of natural language. Their 
biological plausibility had sometimes been questioned in the past. Today, the 
field of computational neuroscience offers several acceptable possibilities of 
modeling higher cognitive functions, and language is among them. 
This paper brings a presentation of some existing connectionist networks mod-
eling natural language. The question of their explanatory power and plausibil-
ity in terms of biological and cognitive systems they are representing is dis-
cussed. 
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Introduction 
The development of computers in the second half of the twentieth century and 
new insights in functioning of the human brain, which developed simultane-
ously, brought many researchers to start thinking of brain as of an extremely 
sophisticated information processing device. This idea (often labelled as com-
puter-metaphor) led further to the emergence of the so-called subsymbolic 
models of cognitive processes. The first wave of enthusiasm subsided after rec-
ognizing limits of perceptrons (Minsky, Papert 1969), but after a while, network 
INFuture2009: ”Digital Resources and Knowledge Sharing” 
230 
architectures were improved (Rumelhart, McClelland, PDP research group 
1986) and computers became much faster and more efficient, resulting in an in-
creased interest in artificial neural networks.  
 
From Early Connectionism to Computational Cognitive 
Neuroscience 
Connectionism (term first used in Feldman, Ballard 1982) is   
“[...] an approach to artificial intelligence (AI) that developed out of at-
tempts to understand how the human brain works at the neural level and, 
in particular, how people learn and remember. (For that reason, this ap-
proach is sometimes referred to as neuronlike computing.)”1 
The term itself refers to the fact that small computing units (neuronlike units) 
are interconnected through a range of connections whose weights have to be 
adjusted during the learning process in order to satisfy all the constraints im-
posed on the network by the learning task. 
After 20 years, models as metaphors are closer to their original inspiration, 
brain, and the term computational neuroscience, although not new (cf. Se-
jnowski, Koch, Churchland 1988), is sometimes preferred, in order to empha-
size the increasing similarity: 
“[...] computational neuroscience makes systematic use of mathematical 
analysis and function of living brains, building on earlier work in both 
neural modeling and biological control theory.” (Arbib, 2002:11) 
From this definition one can see that there are two possible directions for a re-
searcher to choose from: on one side, putting more weight to mathematical 
analysis, striving for better computational efficiency – which is useful in robot-
ics, or, on the other side, giving more attention to the imitation of biological 
structures, which leads to building models of cognitive processes. However, re-
cent development has shown that adhering to biologically plausible models does 
not necessarily mean neglecting computational efficiency, as will be shown in 
further text. 
 
Biology as inspiration 
It is often pointed out that connectionist networks are inspired by biological 
networks of neurons, and therefore they are also known as artificial neural net-
works. In the beginnings of connectionism, neurons and populations of neurons 
were represented as simple computational units, and connections between them 
as relatively simple mathematical functions. Due to this reductionism, connec-
tionist models have often been criticized in different respects (Fodor, Pylyshin 
1988, Pinker, Prince 1988). 
                                                     
1 Citation from Britannica online, accessed on August 13, 2009. 
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However, as the time goes on, the mathematical functions and algorithms have 
become more sophisticated and more adjusted to known biological processes 
and functions, so the focus of criticism has shifted towards other domains. Re-
cently, their capability to represent cognitive processes without using symbol 
manipulation has been questioned (cf. Marcus 2003). This debate (symbolic vs. 
subsymbolic processing) still goes on without an answer (cf. Christiansen, 
Chater 1999), so there is no intention to give the answer in this paper either, but 
rather to show what connectionist models are capable of doing today in ex-
plaining psycholinguistic processes. 
 
Connectionism and language (history) 
Language was one of the cognitive domains covered in the most important vol-
umes dealing with parallel processing in the eighties – the Parallel Distributed 
Processing by Rumelhart, McClelland and the PDP group (1986). The position 
of linguistic phenomena in these volumes indicates the importance of language 
for modelers of cognitive processes. Today, however, the focus has somewhat 
shifted more towards visual processing and memory. Models of linguistic proc-
essing are still present, but their proportion seems to have decreased. 
The models presented here are by far not all that deserve to be presented for 
their importance in development of connectionist networks. They were selected 
due to the fact that the themes they cover – language morphology, represented 
by models of English past tense acquisition, and language syntax, represented 
by models of thematic role assignment – are the themes that appear repeatedly 
in connectionist models. Nevertheless, all those models bring something new in 
terms of architecture or algorithms, and therefore they are different in respect to 
their biological plausibility. Because of their importance for the architecture of 




One of the most debated models in the history of connectionism is the model of 
English past tense acquisition by Rumelhart and McClelland (1986). With the 
perceptron learning algorithm (Rosenblatt 1962) they trained the network to 
connect 430 root verbs with their past tense forms. For the process of learning 
itself, it was important to imitate the U-shaped curve observed by researchers of 
child language acquisition by that time (e.g. Brown 1973). With no means to 
represent the temporal sequence of phonemes, they used a system of so called 
wickelfeatures, where three subsequent phonemes were encoded as one input 
block, followed by another block of three phonemes where the phonemes are 
moved by one and so on. They started with training the network on 10 verbs, 
and after that they proceeded with all remaining 420 verbs. The procedure 
yielded the desired learning outcome, with the network being able to connect 
most of the verbs with their correct past tense form and exhibiting an U-shaped 
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form of the learning curve (showing the process of overregularization), but the 
procedure itself (training the network first on a very small number of verbs, 
than suddenly increasing the training set) as well as the system of wickelfea-
tures were often pointed out as being problematic (Pinker, Prince 1988).  
McClelland and Kawamoto (1986) model of assigning thematic roles to words 
within sentences, i.e. understanding their meaning along with their syntactic 
structure shows that networks are capable of learning concepts greater than 
words - sentences. Sentences are presented to the network as strings of words, 
which are in turn represented as subsets of microfeatures. The architecture is 
similar to those from Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) – simple two-layered, 
feed-forward perceptron. 
The first models showed that there is a good reason to believe that connectionist 
models are indeed capable of approximating at least some aspects of human 
cognitive processes. 
From the point of view of biological plausibility, few questions were posed at 
the time. The first goal – cognitively plausible models – seemed possible to 
achieve, and the second – biological plausibility – was yet to come. 
 
Some important models of natural language in the past 
Elman (1990) proposes a method for encoding temporal sequences, called sim-
ple recurrent network (SRN). Instead of encoding sequences in a spatial manner 
(as seen e.g. in wickelfeatures introduced by Rumelhart and McClelland 
(1986)), he introduces an additional layer to a feedforward network. The new 
layer "memorizes" the current step of the system and feeds its contents back 
into the hidden layer along with the contents of the next step. In this way, the 
network takes into account what it had learnt in the past - a temporal sequence 
of elements. Elman validates the method by testing it on four tasks, three of 
them of linguistic nature - learning a letter sequence, learning to recognize word 
boundaries, learning to categorize words depending on syntactic features of 
simple sentences. The network performs successfully on all three tasks. In the 
first one, it has to learn three short pseudowords - ba, dii and guu. It success-
fully learns to predict vowels, because they always appear after same conso-
nants. It also learns the length of sequences, since they are fixed for every word. 
In the second task, the network learns 14 pseudowords of different length. The 
more elements the network obtains for recognizing the word, the better its pre-
diction for the next element (letter). When the word ends, the networks predic-
tion for the next element is again inaccurate, because it is never sure what the 
next (randomly picked) word will be. One can say that the network has success-
fully learned to recognize word boundaries. In the third task, short sentences 
(two or three words, represented as sparse localist 31-bit vectors) were pre-
sented to the network. This time, the network learns to predict possible word(s) 
to follow and the likelihood of their occurrence. In addition, by analyzing the 
internal representations for each word in the hidden layer, Elman shows that the 
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network has correctly organized the words into semantic categories, based only 
on statistical data - their co-occurrence, sequential order and context. However, 
Elman finds that the categories are not always distinct and clear - some category 
boundaries seem to be “soft” and implicit. 
Trying to improve results obtained earlier by Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) 
in modeling English past tense, Plunkett and Marchman (1993; 1991) adjust the 
training procedure in order to make it more similar to the actual input received 
by children acquiring language. They also start with a smaller set of verbs (ini-
tially 20, eventually 500), but the increase in number of verbs is gradual. New 
verbs are added only after all previous have been acquired. They also try to find 
out the critical extent of irregularities in the training set that might have an im-
pact on learning and explore the possible differences in sizes of the hidden 
layer. Their network is a feed-forward perceptron with a hidden layer, using the 
backpropagation algorithm. Using the new training regime, that was more plau-
sible from the cognitive point of view (more realistic in terms of language ac-
quisition) they obtained better results than Rumelhart and McClelland initially – 
the U-shaped learning occurred without manipulations of the training set. Many 
more models on same topic with similar outcomes were made at that time or 
somewhat later (Daugherty, Seidenberg 1992; Hare, Elman 1992; Hoeffner 
1997). 
In a recurrent network for sentence processing and decoding, St. John and 
McClelland (1991) model a system that makes internal representations of entire 
sentences with their syntactic and semantic properties, similar to cognitive sen-
tence frames made by speakers of natural languages. The network (called the 
Sentence Gestalt network) could recognize thematic roles for words within 
sentences, even when they were ambiguous – the network could distinguish 
thematic roles for words, depending on their variable semantic role within sen-
tences (for possible critique on Sentence Gestalt cf. Plaut, Kello 1999). With 
four hidden and context layers, the architecture of their model is somewhat 
more complex than usual for simple recurrent networks. The difference in word 
representation/encoding is also important, because due to the criticism of Ka-
wamoto and McClelland (1986) model, they avoid to encode words as subsets 
of microfeatures and use localist representations instead (Waskan 2001). 
As much as all the described models represent further improvements for models' 
similarity with cognitive processes they aim to describe, they all basically rely 
on the same principle of backpropagation, which was heavily debated for its in-
compatibility with real biological mechanisms. Furthermore, the question of 
representations (localist or distributed) was raised – distributed representations, 
such as microfeatures used by McClelland and Kawamoto (1986), were said to 
disclose to the network too much information that it should extract (learn) from 
the data on its own. On the other hand side, the localist representations do not 
correspond with the biological reality of data processing. 
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As one can see, in the nineties the models were gradually improving when it 
comes to their performance in representing cognitive processes. However, their 
closeness to their biological ideal remained under question mark, with the 




In the last decade, there were several proposals to improve the problem of bio-
logical plausibility. One of them was postulated by O'Reilly (1998). He de-
scribed six principles that should be followed in order to achieve greater bio-
logical plausibility: The first principle, the biological realism, should be the 
central theme of the cognitive modeling in general. Thereafter, all models 
should be “constrained and informed by the biological properties” of the brain 
(O'Reilly 1998:456). It is not enough that models imitate cognitive processes, 
but they should do so by respecting the biological properties of the brain. 
The first principle is followed by three more that describe the ideal network ar-
chitecture: distributed representations, inhibitory competition and bidirectional 
activation propagation. It is believed that the cortex uses distributed (more neu-
rons are activated at the same time in order to represent a concept), rather than 
localist representations (one neuron-one concept), so the networks should do the 
same. Inhibitory competition between neurons assures that in the process of 
learning only the most strongly excited activations remain active (and the less 
excited are inhibited), and therefore enables the network to make fine differen-
tiations between concepts. In other words, it enables the network to successfully 
distinguish between (even similar) concepts. The bidirectional activation propa-
gation makes it possible to the network to function both bottom-up and top-
down, as it is case in human cognitive processes. In the example of reading, we 
recognize words by recognizing letters (bottom-up), but we can also read a 
word even if we fail to positively identify one of the letters – if we manage to 
recognize the entire word, it will help us fill in the gap (top-down). The two re-
maining principles refer to the learning process – the error-driven task learning 
and the Hebbian model learning. In the past, the error-driven task learning (su-
pervised learning) was most often implemented as the error backpropagation 
(Rumelhart, Hinton, Williams 1986). This procedure was criticized, because 
similar process does not exist in neurobiology. An alternative to it has been 
proposed as early as in 1987 (GeneRec by Hinton, McClelland 1987), but it was 
not widely used until 1996 (Leabra, as an improvement of GeneRec, by 
O'Reilly 1996). It is about settling the network weights in two phases – in the 
first phase, the network's guess is propagated up to the output layer, and in the 
second phase the expected outcome (teacher signal) is propagated. Without any 
backpropagation the difference between the two signals is computed, which 
represents the network's error, and the weights are adjusted according to this er-
ror. The more the network is informed about its errors, the better its guesses be-
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come – it learns. Further constraining an error-driven network by Hebbian 
learning can facilitate the learning and improve the network's results. 
In his paper, O'Reilly (1999) discusses all of these principles and the fact, that 
they are not often combined in models, which makes models less biologically 
plausible; he acknowledges the fact that some of the principles seem to be in 
conflict, but also offers ways to overcome the difficulties – not by simplifying, 
but rather by combining all (or most of) the principles described above.  
In addition, he proposes a new algorithm, called Leabra, in which all of his 
principles were implemented, the biological realism above all: 
“[…] the algorithms they [O’Reilly, Munakata 2000] introduce are con-
strained by biologically realistic principles, and the resulting models thus in-
corporate detailed assumptions about such things as membrane potentials, 
leak currents, or spiking rates.” (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz 2003) 
O'Reilly and Munakata (2000) describe their models of English past tense and 
Sentence gestalt, using the Leabra algorithm (as replications of Hoeffner 1997 
and St. John and McClelland 1990, respectively). For the English past tense 
model, they criticize older models for the fact, that it in all of them there is no 
clear distinction between two levels of analysis that both influence the U-shaped 
learning – the mechanistic level (mechanic properties of the model itself) and 
the environmental level (structure of input data). Relying only on the Leabra al-
gorithm, no context layers in the network, their model is mapping from seman-
tics of the words to their phonological shape. Their results are even more con-
sistent with data for human speakers, compared to usual backpropagation mod-
els.  
The success of replicating the Sentence Gestalt model was comparable to the 
original, managing to satisfy multiple constraints set by syntax and semantic 
simultaneously. Some advantages, however, were observed: learning was much 
faster; Hebbian learning and inhibitory competition, added by the Leabra algo-
rithm made the model more real neuron-like. 
Rosa (2004) compared the performance of two connectionist networks trying to 
solve the same task on the same set of sentences. The task consisted in assign-
ing the thematic roles to words within sentences, fed to the network one at a 
time. The words were encoded as subsets of distributed microfeatures. The only 
difference between the networks were their learning algorithms - the first one 
used the backpropagation algorithm on a simple recurrent network of the Elman 
type (recurrent connections to the context layer from the hidden layer), whereas 
the second used the Leabra algorithm, with no need for additional context lay-
ers. The training corpus consisted of 364 different sentences as combinations of 
30 nouns and 13 verbs, with some verbs allowing for more than one semantic 
interpretation:  
The man hit something. 
The stone hit something. 
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Thematic roles to formal subjects of these two sentences are different – man is 
the agent of the action, and stone is its cause. The ability of the network to dis-
tinguish between the two shows the network's deeper understanding of syntactic 
and semantic relations within the sentence.  
Comparing the overall performance of the two networks, Rosa concludes that 
the network using the Leabra algorithm is not only more acceptable from the 
biological point of view, but also more computationally efficient.  
 
Conclusion 
Although scientists are very much intrigued by psycholinguistic and neurolin-
guistic phenomena, connectionist models, or computational models of cognitive 
(linguistic) processing are not very numerous. There are many more models 
trying to explain our processing of visual stimuli or memory, but the language 
models are not very common, despite their position in the early modeling lit-
erature. Most of the existing models deal with phonetic and/or phonological 
phenomena, widely used for robotic purposes (voice recognition, simple 
text/commands recognition). Only few tackle the language in its complexity 
(such as in Rohde 2002) 
Today, the field of the computational neuroscience offers acceptable ways of 
modeling and exploring higher-level cognitive processes, and can therefore give 
us valuable insights in the core of many (psycho)linguistic processes. 
The art of connectionist networks, their architecture and algorithms have 
evolved since 1986, so that many of their shortcomings pointed out by watchful 
observers are no longer valid (such as in Fodor, Pylyshin 1988; Pinker, Prince 
1988). All models described in the previous chapter make use of a new algo-
rithm that is more consistent with biological properties of neurons and popula-
tions of neurons. Given the fact that Leabra is not the only algorithm of this 
kind (see O'Reilly 1998), but was only chosen to demonstrate the facts, one can 
say that connectionist models today are indeed much closer to the biological 
systems that they were inspired by, than they were only two decades ago.  
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